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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly rule that the release of liability signed by Mr. 
Pearce barred his claims against the Utah Athletic Foundation except for gross negligence? 
PRESERVATION: This issue was briefed by the parties in the memorandum and 
reply memorandum in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment (R. 100-112, 
164-167), and in the plaintiffs opposition to the motion (R. 134-146). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's interpretation of a contract is a 
question of law reviewed de novo. Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const, Inc., 1999 UT 69, 983 
P.2d 575. 
2. Did the trial court err in ruling that no genuine issue of material fact existed as 
to whether UAF was grossly negligent? 
PRESERVATION: This issue was briefed by the parties in the memorandum and 
reply memorandum in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment (R. 112-117, 
169-172), and in the plaintiffs opposition to the motion (R. 146-150). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's determination that no genuine issue of 
material fact existed is a question of law reviewed de novo. Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const, 
Inc., 1999 UT 69, 983 P.2d 575. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES OR REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of, or of central importance to, the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
This action arises out of an injury that plaintiff James Pearce allegedly suffered 
during a bobsled ride. On May 10, 2004, plaintiff filed an action against the operator of 
the bobsled track, the Utah Athletic Foundation (UAF), alleging negligence. (R. 1.) On 
February 25, 2005, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, alleging negligence, gross 
negligence, and breach of warranty against the UAF. (R. 52.) 
On May 2, 2006, the UAF filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds 
that the plaintiffs claims were barred because (1) he had signed a release of liability that 
barred all claims for negligence, (2) there was insufficient evidence in the record to 
maintain a claim of gross negligence; and (3) he could not maintain a claim for breach of 
warranty. (R. 84A, R. 91.) 
After oral argument, the court issued a Ruling and Order granting the motion for 
summary judgment on September 14, 2006. (R. 181.) Plaintiff filed a timely notice of 
appeal. (R. 198.) 
Facts 
In connection with its motion for summary judgment, the UAF submitted a 
detailed statement of undisputed facts consisting of 112 paragraphs. (R. 92-108.) With 
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few exceptions, Pearce did not dispute those facts. The uncontroverted facts in the case, 
taking into account plaintiffs objections, are as follows:1 
In the 1990s, Salt Lake City learned that it would be hosting the 2002 Winter 
Olympics. One of the facilities constructed by the State of Utah for the event was a 
sliding facility in Park City, a refrigerated track that hosted bobsled, luge, and skeleton 
competitions, training, and public use operations. (R. 92 f 5; R. 93 f 10.) (There are 
eleven or twelve such refrigerated tracks in the world. Three are located in North 
America in former Winter Olympics host cities (Park City, Calgary, and Lake Placid). 
(R. 93 U 8.)) 
The sport of bobsled involves sliding down a curvy, ice-covered track in a sled at 
speeds of up to 80 miles per hour. The Park City bobsled track weaves its way through a 
rugged mountain environment. (R. 92 ffif 2, 4; R. 94 ffl[ 17-18.) 
For the Park City track, the State hired as the general contractor Okland 
Construction, who undertook the actual construction. The State hired Van Boerman & 
Frank, an engineering firm, to engineer and design the track. Numerous subcontractors 
and firms were involved with the track's technical design, including concrete and 
refrigeration contractors. The State's Division of Facilities Construction also had input 
into the design of the track. (R. 93, fflj 13-14; R. 94 ffif 15-16.) 
1
 In this statement of facts, the UAF has eliminated language to which Pearce objected in 
the court below. 
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The track had to be designed to specific, international standards in order to qualify 
and be approved for Olympic use. Among the mandated features were specific slope and 
curve requirements, including at least 14 curves and a "labyrinth" section. (R. 94 fflf 17-
18.) The Olympic design criteria also limited the track's G-forces, specifying that a 
competitor could not be subjected to more than 5 Gs for more than 1.5 to 2.5 seconds. 
(R. 94 Tf 19.) As the plaintiff, a mechanical engineer by education and employment, 
explained, G-forces represent a multiplier of gravity, with 1 G equal to the force of 
gravity. (R. 91 Exh. A, pp. 16, 18, 68-69.) 
For a sliding facility to be certified, the Federation Internationale de Bobsleigh et 
de Tobaganning ("FIBT"), the "supreme authority" in all matters relating to international 
bobsleigh and skeleton, undertakes a "homologization" process wherein a committee 
ensures that the track is built as it was designed, and that the design meets the 
engineering criteria. The process involves a series of measurements via survey, tape 
measure, and inclinometer, verifying that the track meets specifications. As part of its 
review, FIBT also conducted additional tests by running bobsleds and other sliding 
devices down the track. The track's curves were tested to ensure that the concrete was 
smooth. (R. 94 % 20; R. 95, ffl| 21-23.) 
The Park City track was completed in 1996, after which the ownership and 
operation were transferred to the Salt Lake Organizing Committee. (R. 92 If 6; R. 93 % 
11.) In early 1997, the Park City track was opened to the public, and the Public Ride 
Program (hereinafter referred to as "PRP") began operations. (R. 93 ^ 7.) 
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Several years later, the 2002 Winter Olympics arrived. Two of the spectators at 
the Olympics were plaintiff James Pearce and his wife. Pearce was a Wyoming resident 
with a home in Park City, Utah. He graduated from college with a degree in mechanical 
engineering, has been employed as an engineer since 1970 or 1971, and was licensed as a 
professional engineer until the early 1990s. (R. 103 f 82; R. 103 ffl[ 77-79.) Pearce and 
his family were active sports enthusiasts, participating in snowmobiling, cross country 
skiing, alpine skiing, gym exercises, golfing, water skiing, bike riding, walking, and 
ballooning, among other activities. (R. 103 U 80; R. 1291f 80.) 
During the Olympics, Pearce and his wife attended ski jumping and luge events at 
the Olympic Park. The luge competition was held on the same track as the bobsled ride 
at issue in this case. As a spectator, Pearce walked up to the site from the parking area 
and walked along the side of the track to view the luge event. (R. 103 1f 82; R. 104 fflf 83-
84.) 
After the Olympics, the Utah Athletic Foundation assumed ownership and 
operation of the Park City track. (R. 92 ^ 3; R. 93 ^ 12.) At the time of Pearce's 
accident, Craig Lehto was General Manager of the UAF. Mr. Lehto had been recruited 
by the State in 1996 to serve as the track manager for the Park City facility. He had 
previously been the manager of the Canadian Olympic Park, with duties including the 
initiation, development, and operation of Calgary's track and its Public Ride Program. 
(R.96f34;R.97f 35.) 
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Operation of the Park City track involves multiple layers of coordination and 
control, including a general manager, a director of operations, control tower operators, 
track technicians/crew, start leaders, a passenger supervisor, full-time bobsled 
technicians, and a safety/compliance coordinator. (R. 95 f 25.) 
The track operates six days per week and may have up to eight track workers 
providing maintenance throughout the day. Track maintenance is constant from the time 
the track is activated in mid-October until the end of March, including repairs to the ice 
surface and sled maintenance. Repairing the ice includes filling in the low points on the 
track with a snow and water mixture, scraping, and smoothing the ice surface. A full-
time sled technician inspects and repairs the bobsleds, including those utilized in the 
Public Ride Program. (R. 96 ffi[ 26-30.) 
Prior to any sliding session, the track is inspected and cleared by a certified track 
worker, who walks the track from top to bottom, checking the condition of the ice and 
every shade, strap, and other appurtenant equipment. Only after conducting this thorough 
inspection is the track deemed ready and available. The track is re-inspected and re-
cleared any time there is more than a 20-minute gap in sled activity. (R. 96 ffl[ 31-33.) 
Although the Public Ride Program had been open for several years when the UAF 
assumed operation, prior to its continuance the UAF effectuated "operational diligence" 
to assess the appropriateness of the program and to better understand the program itself. 
(R. 97 f^ 37.) Part of that diligence included conversations with bobsled drivers about "a 
range of things. Everything . . . ," including helmets, where to deliver information about 
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the ride to passengers, and many logistical issues. (R. 97 f 38; R. 127 f 38; R. 91 Exh. C, 
p. 36 lines 1-15.) 
The UAF did not do any testing independent of that conducted by FIBT and other 
entities involved with the construction, design, engineering, and certification of the track. 
Neither the Lake Placid nor the Calgary tracks conducted additional testing or 
certification prior to operation of their public ride programs. (R. 95 ^ 24; R. 97 f^ 39-40; 
R. I271f39). 
The UAF's bobsleds are configured for a driver and three passengers behind the 
driver. Unlike competition bobsleds, Public Ride Program sleds allow the driver to 
control the braking. Additionally, the sleds have "fins" on the side to protect passengers 
in the event of a rollover and to reduce speed. PRP sleds also have interior handles for 
passengers. The modified sleds were manufactured by Podar; the UAF had no input into 
their design. (R. 97 H 41, R. 98 fj| 42-43; R. 161-162 % 26.) 
The UAF employs professional, World Cup-level drivers for the Public Ride 
Program. The sleds launch from the top of the track at the designated bobsled/skeleton 
start. (To put a four-person bobsled into the track at a lower start location is theoretically 
possible but not practical. If the bobsleds start at locations below the top of the track, the 
sled will not reach the correct finish location as they cannot carry enough speed through 
the corners.) (R. 98 ffl| 44-45; R. 98 f 46.) 
The UAF developed written policies and procedures for the Public Ride Program, 
including a Passenger Ride Program Lead Perspective, which served to inform and train 
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UAF employees about the nature and operation of the program. Employees' 
responsibilities, logistical information, and operational considerations are all addressed in 
the written document. (R. 98, ffif 47-49; R. 91, Exh. G.) 
UAF employees were also provided with a written document addressing common 
questions from patrons. In addition to serving as a resource for UAF employees, 
"Frequently Asked Questions about Bobsled Rides" was provided to public ride 
passengers if they had a question concerning the program. (R. 99 ^ 50; R. 91 Exh. H.) 
At the end of each season, the UAF reviews Public Ride Program operations, 
including injury information. The medical patrol director also prepares monthly reports 
regarding incidents/injuries and reviews such reports with the medical patrol manager. 
The injury reports, including statistics from the PRP, are reported to the Utah Olympic 
Park General Manager. (R. 103 fflf 73-75.) On one occasion, after reviewing incident 
reports, it was determined that the ice on the track was rough and that such condition 
might have contributed to an incident. To address that concern, the track crew did some 
maintenance on the track, smoothing out the ice surface in spots. (R. 103 Tf 76.) 
In developing the Public Ride Program, the UAF held discussions concerning the 
information that was necessary to be conveyed to the public before they went down the 
track. Drivers, supervisors, and others involved with the operation of the track were 
involved in the development of the orientation information. UAF personnel also 
"networked" with their counterparts in Lake Placid and Calgary regarding their PRP 
operations. (R. 99 Tf 51-53.) 
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In 2003, the plaintiffs son, Steven Pearce, expressed a desire to ride the bobsled at 
the Utah Olympic Park, and plaintiffs wife made a reservation for him to ride on his 
own. Later, Pearce decided that if there was an available spot to ride the bobsled, he 
would sign up as well, thinking it would be a fun, exciting thing to do with his son. (R. 
104 fflf 85-86.) On February 27, 2003, he and his son drove to the Olympic Park. 
Before being allowed to ride the bobsled, Public Ride Program participants are 
required to attend an orientation, which includes both video and oral presentations. 
Pearce alleges that his orientation session lasted about fifteen minutes. (R. 99 ^ 54; R. 
128 K 54.) The video presentation showed the bobsled course and bobsleds going down 
the track, with a narrative that informed the participants of the nature and risks associated 
with the ride. (R. 99 % 56; R. 109 H 94.) 
The oral orientation program (PRP Rider Orientation protocol) was memorialized 
in writing, to serve as a guide for the UAF employees involved in the orientation process. 
The presentation is delivered by a UAF employee who works off a "script" or checklist 
of information. (R. 991f 55; R. 91 Exh. I; R. 100 fflf 57-58; R. 91 Exh. J.) 
The orientation informs Public Ride Passengers of the speed of the bobsled, the G-
forces involved, what to do if the bobsled rolls over, how to fit the helmet, risks 
associated with certain health conditions such as back injuries, neck injuries, and 
pregnancy, the violence of the ride itself, and the option not to ride if one feels 
apprehensive or reluctant. The oral orientation includes an express warning that 
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passengers with back, neck, or spine problems should not participate in the bobsled ride. 
(R. 100 K 60; R. 106198.) 
As part of the orientation, Pearce was told that the ride was "high G forces," "the 
most exciting roller coaster ride you've been on." The bobsled was described as a 
"thrilling ride, fast ride, exciting ride, it was an aggressive ride," or words to that effect. 
(R. 91 Exh. A, pp. 67-68, 87; R. 106 ffi[ 95-96.) As an engineer, Pearce understood the 
meaning of high G-forces, a "high, you know, gravity, multiplier of gravity. . . . A G 
force, if you have a one-pound object sitting on that table and it is subjected to four Gs, it 
will have an equivalent force to four pounds." (R. 106 U 97; R. 91 Exh. A, pp. 68-69.) 
After the orientation, Pearce was required to sign a release if he wanted to ride the 
bobsled. (R. 101 ffi[ 61-62; R. 91 Exh. L; R. 156 Exh. A, p. 33.) A copy of the release 
used during the 2002-03 season is attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit B.2 
Pearce "looked at it. I knew it was a release. . . . It was typical of releases on the 
back of your parking ticket." He did not have any questions regarding the document, but 
alleges that he did not understand that it would release the UAF from liability from its 
own negligence. (R. 91 Exh. A, p. 65; R. 105 Iffl 92-93; R. 129 U 92.) 
The release signed by Pearce is less than one page in length. It is titled 
"AGREEMENT TO USE FACILITIES OF OLYMPIC PARKS OF UTAH." 
Immediately below the title, it states: "IMPORTANT: THIS IS A LEGAL 
2
 The parties were unable to locate the original release that Mr. Pearce signed. However, 
it is undisputed that he signed a copy of the release attached as Addendum Exh. B. 
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DOCUMENT. PLEASE READ IN FULL AND UNDERSTAND BEFORE SIGNING." 
(R.91Exh.L.) 
The release begins with this language in bold print: 
You/your minor child may be hurt using the facilities and equipment of the 
Olympic Parks of Utah, which include the Utah Olympic Park, the Utah Olympic 
Oval and Soldier Hollow ("the Sports facilities"). If you are unwilling to assume 
all the risks of your/your minor child's use of the Sports Facilities, DO NOT sign 
this document, in which case you/your minor child will NOT be authorized to use 
the Sports Facilities, and you will be refunded any monies you paid to use the 
Sports Facilities. If you sign this document BUT make any alterations to it, you 
are NOT authorized to use the Sports Facilities. 
(R.91Exh.L.)3 
The release then sets forth three numbered paragraphs. The middle paragraph 
provides consent to medical treatment, use of images, etc. The other paragraphs state 
(with emphasis in the original): 
1. Assumptions of Risks. I, for myself . . . wish to use the Sports 
Facilities and may engage in one or more sports, including without 
limitation: . . . bobsled . . . . I understand that the Sports are high-speed 
action and adventure sports that involve many inherent risks and dangers 
and that using the Sports Facilities or participating in the Sports may put 
me . . . at risk of serious injury or illness. These dangers include but are not 
limited to: . . . risk-creating weather conditions and variations in terrain; 
accidents by other users of the Sports Facilities; failure to follow safely 
procedures, or to stay within ability or control; limits or defects in the 
Sports Facilities. I am also aware that hazards may exist throughout the 
Sports Facilities, may be unmarked and occur without warning, and that 
helmets, safety equipment, proficiency checks, supervision and 
enforcement of rules do not and cannot guarantee my . . . safety. I . . . am 
able to perform the essential functions required to use the Sports Facilities 
and participate in the Sports and I am freely and voluntarily participating in 
the Sports and the use of the Sports Facilities. I REPRESENT AND 
3
 Most of the ellipses in the quotations that follow are references to "minor child" 
following "you," "I," or "my." 
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WARRANT THAT I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD THIS 
DOCUMENT, AM OF SOUND MIND, HAVE LEGAL AUTHORITY, 
AND FREELY ACCEPT AND FULLY ASSUME THE RISK THAT I . . . 
CAN SUFFER PROPERTY DAMAGE, ILLNESS, SEVERE PERSONAL 
INJURY OR EVEN DEATH BY USING THE SPORTS FACILITIES OR 
PARTICIPATING IN THE SPORTS, not only the ways described above, 
but also in ways that are unknown and unexpected, even if I follow . . . 
instructions or advice. 
* * * 
3. Waiver, Release and Indemnification. I understand and agree that 
the UAF is not an insurer of my conduct. TO THE FULLEST EXTENT 
PERMITTED BY LAW, I HEREBY RELEASE, WAIVE, COVENANT 
NOT TO SUE, AND DISCHARGE THE UAF . . . FROM ANY AND 
ALL LIABILITY, CLAIMS, DEMANDS, AND CAUSES OF ACTION 
WHATSOEVER ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO ANY LOSS, 
DAMAGE, OR INJURY, INCLUDING DEATH, THAT MAY BE 
SUSTAINED BY ME . . . OR LOSS OR DAMAGE TO ANY 
PROPERTY BELONGING TO ME . . . WHETHER CAUSED BY THE 
NEGLIGENCE OF RELEASEES OR OTHERWISE, ARISING OUT OF 
OR RELATED TO MY . . . USE OF THE SPORTS FACILITIES OR 
PARTICIPATION IN THE SPORTS, THAT I WILL INDEMNIFY THE 
RELEASEES AGAINST SUCH CLAIMS, INCLUDING PAYMENT OF 
ATTORNEY FEES. I AGREE THAT THIS DOCUMENT SHALL BIND 
MY GUARDIAN, ASSIGNS, HEIRS, ADMINISTRATORS AND 
EXECUTORS FOREVER. 
See Addendum Exh. B. A signature line follows, along with a line for emergency contact 
information. 
Pearce understood at that point that he was free not to go on the bobsled ride. 
After the orientation, he and his son waited until the various groups of passengers were 
called out to the start platform and bobsled assignments were made. He was then given a 
helmet and told how to fit it. (R. 106 ffl[ 100-103.) 
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On the starting platform, UAF start leaders again inform PRP passengers of the 
risks of the ride, including that speeds may reach 82 miles per hour, and that they may 
experience up to 5 G-forces. They again instruct patrons not to ride if they have a bad 
back or recent surgery. (R. 101 ffl[ 63-65.) Start leaders also reiterate that the Public 
Ride Program is a voluntary ride and that the passenger may forego the ride and receive a 
refund. (R. 101 f 66; R. 106 HH 101-101.) 
UAF personnel have been told by their drivers that the fourth position is "more 
intense" and that passengers in the fourth position "feel" the ride more. General laws of 
physics indicate that with any moving object, there is a transfer of weight to the rear 
position in the sled. (R. 101 If 67; R. 102 ^ 68-69.) Pearce denies being aware that the 
rear position would experience greater G-forces than other seats.4 
The start leaders and the driver review the physique of the prospective passengers 
and decide who looks the strongest for placement in the fourth position. The start leaders 
and drivers then place the passengers into the second, third, and fourth positions behind 
the driver. (R. 101 f 67; R. 102 U 71.) 
Before positioning Pearce and the other passengers, a UAF employee asked Pearce 
if he had a strong back. Pearce said that he does not recall his exact response, but, "I told 
her I don't know how to answer that. I said I think so, but I don't know how to answer 
that, or something to that effect." His son testified that Pearce responded "something to 
4
 According to Pearce's son Steven, PRP officials stated before the ride that, with respect 
to G forces, "you would feel it more in seat number four." (R. 160 ^ 70.) Pearce, 
however, denies that any such statement was made. (R. 128-129.) 
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the effect of, yes, I have a strong back." The bobsled driver then positioned the 
passengers in the bobsled, placing Pearce in the fourth position. (R. 91 Exh. A, p. 83; R. 
1071105; R. 129-1301f 105; R. 156 Exh. A, p. 45.)5 
The passengers were instructed how to position themselves in the bobsled while it 
went down the track. Pearce was instructed to lean slightly forward, put his hands 
through the handles, shrug his shoulders to hold the stability of his head, and compress 
through the curves. (R. 102 ^  72.) He testified that he was told to lean forward "because 
we don't want your head - you know, we don't want you falling backwards out of the 
sled, and there was no back on the sled." (R. 91 Exh. A, p. 87.) 
During the ride, Pearce suffered a lumbar burst fracture of his back. His injury 
was caused entirely by the G-forces of the ride; no collision or tipping occurred. (R. 1; R. 
125.) There is no evidence that the ride generated G-forces greater than the 5 that UAF 
had warned of before the ride. 
In his Amended Complaint, Pearce alleged three causes of action against the UAF: 
First, he alleged negligence resulting from the UAF's breach of duty in failing to know 
that the greatest force is on the last rider in the bobsled; failing to equip the bobsled with 
a small backrest for the last rider; failing to use an alternative starting point for the 
bobsleds; failing to eliminate the last riding position; failing to adequately inform the 
5
 Unfortunately, plaintiff had, in fact, suffered from back problems prior to February 
2003, including a ruptured disk in 1997. On one occasion about ten years earlier, 
Pearce's back problem had been severe enough that he was flat on his back in bed. (R. 
107 K 107; R. 130 TI130.) 
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public of the risks associated with the bobsled; and failing to discover the risks associated 
with the fourth position. (R.l 1fl[ 9-22.) 
Second, Pearce alleged gross negligence resulting from the UAF's failure to 
undertake any testing, inspections, or analysis to determine the risks to the riders in the 
last seat; not ensuring that patrons were warned of the risks of riding in the last seat; and 
failing to realize the strong probability of harm that could result to the public by not 
taking steps to discover the risk of injury to riders in the last seat. (R.l fflf 24-33.) 
Third, Pearce alleged breach of warranty. His brief on appeal does not challenge 
the dismissal of his warranty claim. Consequently, the claim is not addressed herein. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly held that the exculpatory waiver signed by James Pearce 
before he was went on the bobsled ride precludes his negligence claims against the UAF. 
This Court has consistently held that, as long as such a waiver is clear and unequivocal, it 
is enforceable and serves to bar claims for simple negligence. 
The release in this case satisfies the test. It is short. It emphasizes the critical 
language with underlining and capital letters. Paragraph 3 expressly releases "any and 
all" claims, "whether caused by the negligence of releasees or otherwise." Pearce's claim 
that the release is ambiguous because Paragraph 1 (which discusses assumptions of risks) 
does not also mention "negligence" ignores the plain language of the contract. His claim 
that he did not understand the full import of the release is immaterial where its language 
is unambiguous. 
In arguing that he should nonetheless be allowed to avoid the release because it is 
unconscionable, Pearce bears a heavy burden. No substantive unconscionability can be 
shown, because the content of the agreement is not "so one-sided as to oppress an 
innocent party." As a long line of cases from this Court demonstrates, the mere fact that 
a contract discharges liability for one party's negligence does not make it oppressive. 
Nor was there any procedural unconscionability—Pearce was free at all times to reject 
the release and forego the bobsled ride. Instead, he chose to sign a release of "any and 
all" claims, broad language that covered all forms of simple negligence that occurred, 
whether named in the release or not. 
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Pearce9 s next argument that the release is void as against public policy is not 
supported by Utah law. Contracts are, by their nature, supposed to produce predictable 
results. It is a strong public policy of this state that persons who enter into unambiguous 
contracts are bound by what they sign. The alternative standard urged by Pearce would 
essentially render all exculpatory waivers meaningless, because they could be avoided by 
simply alleging that the released party negligently failed to discover or disclose a 
particular danger. Any such restriction on an entire class of contracts should be left to the 
legislature, not the courts, particularly as the Utah legislature has chosen not to regulate 
exculpatory waivers except in very limited circumstances. 
Policy considerations militate against the case-by-case enforcement of contracts, 
as would result if the Court applied the factors set forth in Tunkl v. Regents of the 
University of California, 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (Cal. 1963) to every waiver. As most 
courts conclude, public policy should not be invoked to invalidate an otherwise 
enforceable waiver unless the activity in question affects the public interest. 
The trial court was also correct in concluding that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists with respect to whether the UAF was grossly negligent. As a matter of law, and in 
light of the undisputed actions undertaken by the UAF to make its Public Ride Program 
safe, the few alleged missteps cited by Pearce do not rise to the level of gross negligence. 
17 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT PEARCE'S 
NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS WERE BARRED BY THE RELEASE.6 
A. The Waiver, Release and Indemnification agreement executed by Pearce 
bars his negligence claims. 
The ability of adults to allocate risks among themselves by contract, including the 
waiver of claims for future negligence, has been repeatedly recognized in this state for 
half a century. See Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901, 905 (Utah App. 1995); 
Krauss v. Utah State Dep't ofTransp., 852 P.2d 1014, 1020 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993); Zollman v. Myers, 797 F.Supp. 923, 927 (D. Utah 1992); 
Palmer v. Davis, 808 P.2d 128, 132 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); 
Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 371-72 (Utah 1990); Pickhover v. 
Smith's Management Corp., Ill P.2d 664, 667-68 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 
P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); Simonson v. Travis, 728 P.2d 999, 1002 (Utah 1986); DCR Inc. v. 
Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1983); Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal 
Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1983); DuBois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823, 824-25 
(Utah 1978); Union Pac. R.R. v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 568 P.2d 724, 725-26 
(Utah 1977); Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthen, 18 Utah 2d 263, 265, 420 P.2d 848, 849 
(1966); Union Pac. R.R. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah 2d 255,260, 408 P.2d 910, 
6
 Pearce's brief begins with the issue of whether he adduced sufficient evidence to raise 
an issue of fact as to gross negligence. While the UAF agrees that this is the dispositive 
issue on appeal, it seems logical to address the effect of the release on Pearce's 
negligence claims first. 
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913-14 (1965); Walker Bank and Trust Company v. First Security Corporation, 341 P.2d 
944, 947 (Utah 1959). 
As this Court noted in Hawkins v. Peart, 2001 UT 94, 37 P.3d 1062: 
The rule regarding releases, to which the district court and Russ referred, is stated 
as a general principle of the common law in 6A Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on 
Contracts, § 1472, at 596-97 (1962): 
It is generally held that those who are not engaged in public service may 
properly bargain against liability for harm caused by their ordinary 
negligence in performance of contractual duty; but such an exemption is 
always invalid if it applies to harm wilfully inflicted or caused by gross or 
wanton negligence. 
Thus, most courts allow release of liability for prospective negligence, except 
where there is a strong public interest in the services provided. 
Id., f 9. See also 8 Williston on Contracts § 19:22 (4th ed.) ("Because certain agreements 
are affected with a public interest, exculpation clauses contained in them are not 
enforceable, but when the public interest is not implicated, private parties are free among 
themselves to shift a risk through the use of an exculpatory provision"); W. Page Keeton, 
et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 68 (5th ed.). 
While courts generally refrain from interfering with individuals' freedom to 
contract, they are also uncomfortable with the notion of disclaiming liability for one's 
own negligence. The Court has reconciled these competing concerns by imposing special 
restrictions on exculpatory waivers that are not applied to other contracts: such waivers 
are strictly construed against the released party, and are upheld only when the intent to 
release claims for the other party's negligence is clear and unequivocal. See Bishop v. 
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Gentec, Inc., 2002 UT 36, ^ 19, 48 P.3d 218. The release signed by Pearce satisfies those 
requirements. 
B. The release unambiguously bars all claims for negligence. 
Whether language in a release is clear and unequivocal is a question of law. 
Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1358-1359 (Utah 1996). The district 
court correctly concluded that the release in Pearce's release meets this test. 
The release is less than one page long. It is prefaced with a reminder that it is a 
legal document, and that Pearce should read it in full and understand it before signing it. 
The opening sentence warns Pearce that he "may be hurt using the facilities and 
equipment" of the UAF, and that he will not be allowed on the bobsled ride unless he 
agrees to assume "aU the risks" of his use of the facilities. (Emphasis added.) See Gara 
v. Woodbridge Tavern, 224 Mich. App. 63, 568 N.W.2d 138, 140 (1997) ("there is no 
broader classification than the word 'all.' In its ordinary and natural meaning, the word 
'all' leaves no room for exceptions"); Freund, 693 P.2d at 371 (noting broad scope of 
words "any and all" in indemnification clause). 
Three numbered paragraphs then follow. Each paragraph identifies its subject 
with bold, i.e., "1. Assumptions of risks." and "3. Waiver, Release and 
Indemnification." Some information is underlined, and, when it reaches the signer's 
affirmative release of liability, it alerts the reader by switching from regular to capital 
letters. See Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24, ^ 52, 20 P.3d 876 (noting that disclaimer 
appeared in capital letters). 
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1. Assumptions of Risks. I, for myself . . . wish to use the Sports 
Facilities and may engage in one or more sports, including without 
limitation: . . . bobsled . . . . I understand that the Sports are high-speed 
action and adventure sports that involve many inherent risks and dangers 
and that using the Sports Facilities or participating in the Sports may put 
me . . . at risk of serious injury or illness. These dangers include but are not 
limited to: . . . risk-creating weather conditions and variations in terrain; 
accidents by other users of the Sports Facilities; failure to follow safety 
procedures, or to stay within ability or control; limits or defects in the 
Sports Facilities. I am also aware that hazards may exist throughout the 
Sports Facilities, may be unmarked and occur without warning, and that 
helmets, safety equipment, proficiency checks, supervision and 
enforcement of rules do not and cannot guarantee my . . . safety. I . . . am 
able to perform the essential functions required to use the Sports Facilities 
and participate in the Sports and I am freely and voluntarily participating in 
the Sports and the use of the Sports Facilities. I REPRESENT AND 
WARRANT THAT I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD THIS 
DOCUMENT, AM OF SOUND MIND, HAVE LEGAL AUTHORITY, 
AND FREELY ACCEPT AND FULLY ASSUME THE RISK THAT I . . . 
CAN SUFFER PROPERTY DAMAGE, ILLNESS, SEVERE PERSONAL 
INJURY OR EVEN DEATH BY USING THE SPORTS FACILITIES OR 
PARTICIPATING IN THE SPORTS, not only the ways described above, 
but also in ways that are unknown and unexpected, even if I follow . . . 
instructions or advice. 
2. Consent to Medical Treatment Consent to Use of Images. Etc. . . . 
3. Waiver, Release and Indemnification. I understand and agree that 
the UAF is not an insurer of my conduct. TO THE FULLEST EXTENT 
PERMITTED BY LAW, I HEREBY RELEASE, WAIVE, COVENANT 
NOT TO SUE, AND DISCHARGE THE UAF [AND OTHERS], 
COLLECTIVELY "RELEASEES" FROM ANY AND ALL LIABILITY, 
CLAIMS, DEMANDS, AND CAUSES OF ACTION WHATSOEVER 
ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO ANY LOSS, DAMAGE, OR 
INJURY, INCLUDING DEATH, THAT MAY BE SUSTAINED BY ME . 
. . OR LOSS OR DAMAGE TO ANY PROPERTY BELONGING TO ME 
. . . WHETHER CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF RELEASEES OR 
OTHERWISE, ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO MY . . . USE OF 
THE SPORTS FACILITIES OR PARTICIPATION IN THE SPORTS, 
THAT I WILL INDEMNIFY THE RELEASEES AGAINST SUCH 
CLAIMS, INCLUDING PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES. I AGREE 
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THAT THIS DOCUMENT SHALL BIND MY GUARDIAN, ASSIGNS, 
HEIRS, ADMINISTRATORS AND EXECUTORS FOREVER. 
In Paragraph 3, Pearce specifically and unequivocally agreed to release "any and 
all liability, claims, demands, and causes of action whatsoever . . . whether caused by the 
negligence of releasees or otherwise." (Emphasis added.) It is hard to imagine how the 
intent to release claims for negligence could be expressed more clearly, particularly when 
the word "negligence" is expressly stated. Russ, 905 P.2d at 905 (word "negligence" is 
not required in order to release negligence claims, as long as intent to release such claims 
can be clearly implied from language), citing Freund, 793 P.2d at 371-72. 
Pearce argues, however, that the release is ambiguous because it allegedly 
"preserves negligence claims in Part I but, according to the trial court, waives those 
claims in Part III." (Brief of Appellant, pp. 43-46.) This argument fails in its underlying 
premise. Nowhere does Paragraph 1 "preserve" negligence claims. In that paragraph, 
Pearce acknowledged that he was assuming all inherent risks of participating in the sport, 
which were defined as including "failure to follow safety procedures [and] limits or 
defects in the Sports Facilities." He was "also aware that hazards may exist throughout 
the Sports Facilities, may be unmarked and occur without warning . . . ." Pearce 
represented that he "freely accepts and fully assumes the risk that [he] can suffer property 
damage, illness, severe personal injury or even death by using the sports facilities or 
participating in the sports, not only the ways described above, but also in ways that are 
unknown and unexpected . . . . " 
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Pearce contends that paragraph 1 did not ask the signer to assume the risk of 
UAF's negligence, and therefore it "preserved" negligence claims. (Brief of Appellant, 
p. 45; id. at 46 (Paragraph 1 "reserves to the public negligence claims").) However, the 
paragraph defines "inherent risks" to include negligent acts, such as failure to follow 
safety procedures or defects in the facilities, along with any other unknown or unexpected 
way in which injury might occur. Moreover, the absence of the word "negligence" in 
Paragraph 1 does not create an ambiguity. See, e.g., Level 3 Communications, LLC, v. 
Public Service Commission, 2007 UT App 127, f 16, — P.3d — (fact that agreement 
was silent as to effect on particular circumstance "does not alone render the contract 
ambiguous. Certainly a contract need not negate every possible construction of its terms 
in order to be unambiguous'") (quoting Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 721 (1st Cir. 
1996)). 
Pearce9s argument would require the Court to completely ignore other language in 
the release, including the opening clause, in which Pearch assumed "all the risks" of the 
ride, and Paragraph 3, in which he waived and released "any and all" claims 
"whatsoever," "whether caused by the [UAF's] negligence" or not. Courts do not 
disregard language in or rewrite contracts. Bakowski v. Mountain State Steel, Inc., 2002 
UT 62, Tf 19, 52 P.3d 1179. Nor will a court "avoid a contract's plain language to achieve 
an 'equitable' result." Id. 
There simply is no ambiguity in Paragraph 3's intent or wording. Its language is 
similar to - indeed, more explicit than - other releases upheld in Utah. In Russ, for 
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example, the Court of Appeals addressed a release that held the defendant harmless from 
"any and all claims, damages, loss and expenses," "to the fullest extent permitted by 
law," for "any death, accident, injury, or other occurrence resulting from visits to the job 
site." That language, the court said, met the test of enforceability under Utah law: "The 
broad sweep of the provision's language clearly and unequivocally establishes the parties' 
intent to avoid [defendant's] potential liability arising from the [plaintiffs] loss or injury 
incurred during job site visits." 905 P.2d at 906. 
Pearce suggests that he did not study the document carefully and/or did not 
understand the full import of what he was signing, but a signer's subjective intent is 
immaterial. "A signatory cannot, with hindsight, claim ignorance of the contract and 
thereby escape liability." Id. at n.l (citation omitted). "One party to a contract does not 
have a duty to ensure that the other has a complete and accurate understanding of all 
terms embodied in a written contract." Id. Put simply, a released party "is not required 
to show that [the plaintiff] understood the hold harmless provision before [it] asserts the 
provision's protection." Id. 
C. The release is not unconscionable. 
Pearce argues that the release should not be enforced because it is unconscionable 
and/or contrary to public policy. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 31-43.) "A party claiming 
unconscionability bears a heavy burden. The law enables parties to freely contract, 
establishing terms and allocating risks between them." Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 
972 P.2d 395, 402 (Utah 1998). "The law even permits parties to enter into unreasonable 
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contracts or contracts leading to a hardship on one party." Id. (citing Bekins Bar V Ranch 
v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1983)). 
This Court has adopted a two-pronged analysis for determining whether a contract 
is unconscionable. Ryan, 972 P.2d at 402. The first prong, substantive 
unconscionability, focuses on the agreement's contents. The second prong, procedural 
unconscionability, focuses on its formation. In some circumstances, substantive 
unconscionability in itself may void a contract; procedural unconscionability by itself 
cannot. Id. 
Substantive unconscionability cannot be shown by the mere fact that a contract 
contains (allegedly) unreasonable terms, or that it is more advantageous to one party than 
the other. Id. Courts "will not assume the paternalistic role of declaring that one who 
has freely bound himself need not perform because the bargain is not favorable." Bekins, 
supra. Rather, "the terms must be so one-sided as to oppress . . . an innocent party." 
Ryan, supra, (court's ellipse). That is not present here. While courts have characterized 
exculpatory clauses as disfavored in the law, such agreements have consistently been 
held valid and enforceable if they are clear and unambiguous. 
Procedural unconscionability also cannot be shown. Under this prong, a court 
asks "whether there was overreaching by a contracting party occupying an unfairly 
superior bargaining position." Ryan, 972 P.2d at 403. UAF did not occupy an unfairly 
superior bargaining position. It offered Pearce an opportunity to engage in a recreational 
activity if he so desired. As thrilling as the bobsled experience might be, no one can 
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suggest that riding in it is so essential that it deprives the customer of any meaningful 
choice in the matter. See, e.g., Williams v. Cox Enterprisees, Inc., 159 Ga. App. 333, 283 
S.E.2d 367, 369 (1981) (characterizing as "ludicrous" an argument that race sponsor had 
unfair bargaining power because event's popularity and limited availability placed 
participants under "enormous pressure to enter it on whatever terms were offered to 
them"); Reed v. University of North Dakota, 589 N.W.2d 880, 887 (N.D. 1999) (no unfair 
disparity in bargaining power; although provider would not have allowed participation in 
race without a waiver, plaintiff was not under any economic or other compulsion). 
Nor does the fact that the release is a standard form and that Pearce had no 
opportunity to negotiate its terms demonstrate procedural unconscionability. See Ryan, 
972 P.2d at 404 (rejecting similar arguments). Pearce argues, however, that he did not 
realize that he could suffer injury from the normal operation of the bobsled ride. This 
assertion is difficult to comprehend. It is undisputed that Pearce knew he would be 
rocketing down a icy, curvy track at 80 miles an hour and experiencing gravitational 
pressures of up to 5 times his own body weight. Additionally, by signing the release, 
Pearce acknowledged his awareness that serious injury or even death could occur during 
the ride. 
Pearce also suggests that the release is unconscionable because it does not identify 
the specific risk or specific form of alleged negligence that caused his injury. (Brief of 
Appellant, p. 42, citing Meese v. Brigham Young University, 639 P.2d 720, 724 (Utah 
1981)). Meese involved implied, not express or contractual, assumption of the risk. 
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Delineation of the particular risk is not required in order to enforce an exculpatory 
waiver. See, e.g., Flood v. Young Woman's Christian Association of Brunswick, 398 F.3d 
1261, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying Georgia law) (where waiver covered risk of 
"any" injury that might occur, no requirement that agreement list actual risk faced while 
at facility); Dean v. MacDonald, 147 N.H. 263, 786 A.2d 834 (2001) ("the parties need 
not have contemplated the precise occurrence that caused the plaintiffs injuries"); Reed 
v. University of North Dakota, 589 N.W.2d 880 (N.D. 1999) (by agreeing to assume all 
responsibility for injury and not pursue any claims, runner assumed risk of dehydration 
and inadequate medical assistance, even though not specified in the release); Skotak v. 
Vic Tanny Intern., Inc., 203 Mich. App. 616, 513 N.W.2d 428 (1994) (release barred 
claims for lack of available medical assistance even though specific risk was not 
mentioned); Madison v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App.3d 589, 250 Cal. Rptr. 299, 307 
(1988) (not every possible act of negligence has to be spelled out in release; knowledge 
of specific risk is only relevant to implied assumption of the risk, not express 
assumption). See also Lee v. Thorpe, 2006 UT 66, 147 P.3d 443 (enforcing waiver of all 
tort claims arising out of capture by bounty hunter, even if apprehension was illegal 
under Utah law; "Nothing befell Gerald to which he had not consented").7 
7
 One can only imagine what a release would look like if it had to identify every potential 
risk or form of negligence that might occur. Instead of a readable form in which the rider 
releases all negligence claims, plain and simple, the release would turn into a pages-long 
laundry list of hypothetical scenarios. 
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D. The release is not void on public policy grounds. 
Pearce's next contention is that the release violates public policy. Analysis of this 
issue must begin with a reminder that the enforcement of contractual obligations is itself 
an important policy of this state. Otteson v. Malone, 584 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah 1978) ("A 
written contract duly entered into should be regarded with some sanctity"). As Williston 
observes, "public policy requires that parties of full age and competent understanding 
must have the greatest freedom of contracting, and contracts, when entered into freely 
and voluntarily, must be upheld and enforced by the courts." 5 Williston on Contracts § 
12:3 (4th ed.). 
The law governing exculpatory clauses in Utah is well established. (See pp. 16-
17, supra.) Pearce asks this Court to discard this settled jurisprudence and instead adopt 
a new test unique to this jurisdiction, namely: "Where a provider of a recreational 
activity knows, or should know, of a substantial risk of serious injury which is not an 
obvious or inherent risk of the activity, the provider cannot contract around the risk 
unless meaningfully disclosed and assumed." (Brief of Appellant, p. 32.) 
Pearce acknowledges that no other court has adopted such a standard, but argues 
that it is needed because "one might be careless of another's life and limb, if there is no 
penalty for carelessness." (Id, p. 35, quoting Hawkins, 2001 UT 94, % 13.) The 
underlying premise is flawed, however. An assumption that conscious decisions will be 
made to ignore risks if releases are enforceable overlooks the fact that a conscious 
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decision to ignore serious risks would not be simple negligence, it would be gross 
negligence, and would thus remain actionable regardless of an exculpatory waiver. 
Moreover, there is serious question as to the validity of the assumption that 
enforcing waivers eliminates a facility's incentive to be careful. See, e.g., R. Heidt, "The 
Avid Sportsman and the Scope for Self-protection: When Exculpatory Clauses Should be 
Enforced," 38 U.Rich.L.Rev. 381, 471-72 (2004) (refuting suggestion that waivers reduce 
incentive for vendor care; arguing that "other concerns than the wish to avoid tort liability 
will continue to provide that incentive"). In this case, for example, even with its 
exculpatory clause in place, the UAF devoted considerable effort to keeping the track 
smooth and clear and the sleds maintained, providing orientation to riders, screening out 
passengers with bad backs, etc. 
Pearce's construct would essentially render exculpatory agreements meaningless 
because they would not bar negligence claims if a provider was negligent in failing to 
discover or "meaningfully" disclose the alleged danger—in other words, claims for 
negligence would be barred by a release unless the provider was negligent. Pearce's 
argument is essentially a request to eliminate exculpatory waivers altogether. 
In a related point, Pearce argues that the release "is clearly unenforceable under 
four of the six factors" identified in Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 383 
P.2d 441, 445-46 (1963). No analysis is offered as to the appropriateness of applying 
these factors to the release, and doing so would raise a broader question: Why should 
courts subject every exculpatory clause to an automatic public policy analysis, as Pearce 
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suggests? Vitiating a contract on public policy grounds is supposed to be a rarity. 
Enforcement of an otherwise enforceable contract has never been thought of as a case-by-
case proposition in Utah. 
If substantive restrictions are to be imposed on an entire class of contracts, it is a 
matter for the legislature, not the judiciary. See, e.g., Wolf v. Ford, 335 Md. 525, 644 
A.2d 522, 531 (1994) ("In the absence of legislation to the contrary, exculpatory clauses 
are generally valid, and the public policy of freedom of contract is best served by 
enforcing the provisions of the clause"), citing 57A Am.Jur.2d, Negligence § 53 (1989).8 
The Utah legislature has chosen not to regulate exculpatory waivers. To the 
contrary, it has recognized the presumptive validity of such releases in all but a few 
narrow contexts. For example, the legislature has declared that any exculpatory clause in 
a product liability case "shall be contrary to public policy and is void." Utah Code Ann. 
§78-15-2. 
The legislature has likewise declared an exculpatory clause in a trust agreement 
"unenforceable to the extent that it: (1) relieves the trustee of liability for breach of trust 
committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust or the 
interest of the beneficiaries; or (2) was inserted by the trustee or fiduciary without 
disclosure of its existence and contents." Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1008. It has barred 
certain indemnification agreements in construction contracts as contrary to public policy 
8
 Alternatively, any such change should be prospective only, considering that parties in 
this state have been induced to provide services in reliance on a long line of 
pronouncements from this Court. 
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and void. Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-8-1, -2. See also Utah Code Ann. § 13-35-201(l)(e) 
(prohibiting certain franchisors from requiring "a release, assignment, waiver, or estoppel 
that would: (i) relieve a franchisor from any liability"); Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-1809, -
1810 (invalidating indemnification agreements in LLC operating agreements that are 
inconsistent with statutory standards, which are to be construed "so as to give the 
maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract"). 
Neither the legislature, nor the Constitution, nor prior decisions of this Court 
support Pearce's public policy argument. See Ryan, 972 P.2d at 405 (public policy 
exceptions should be "narrowly construe[d]"); id. ("A public policy is 'clear' only if 
plainly defined by legislative enactments, constitutional standards, or judicial decisions"); 
American Airlines v. Christensen, 967 F.2d 410, 414 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying Utah 
law) (refusing to invalidate no-transfer clause in airline contract on public policy 
grounds; "we are mindful of Utah's practice of interpreting public policy very 
narrowly"). 
Exculpatory waivers are already scrutinized more closely than insurance policies, 
loan agreements, or virtually any other kind of contract. They cannot release claims for 
product liability, warranty, gross negligence, intentional acts, or claims by minors. But 
they have been held enforceable in all other contexts for 50 years. 
Pearce's argument would introduce an inherent unpredictability into contract law 
that would paralyze every business and industry that relies on waivers to procure liability 
insurance and to stay in business. Passengers would not have to worry about the G-forces 
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on a bobsled ride any more because there would be no bobsled ride. As one court 
observed: 
If a prospective participant wishes to place himself in the competition sufficiently 
to voluntarily agree that he will not hold the organizer or sponsor of the event 
liable for his injuries, the courts should enforce such agreements. If these 
agreements, voluntarily entered into, were not upheld, the effect would be to 
increase the liability of those organizing or sponsoring such events to such an 
extent that no one would be willing to undertake to sponsor a sporting event. 
Clearly, this would not be in the public interest. 
Gore v. Tri-County Raceway, Inc., 407 F.Supp. 489 (D. Ala. 1974). See also Heidt, 38 
U.Rich.L.Rev. at 381-382 (noting that "the expansion of tort liability since the 1960s has 
coincided with a sharp curtailment of the availability of some recreational activities"); G. 
Johnson, "Enforceability of Exculpatory Clauses in Hazardous Recreational Activities," 
1998 Utah Bar J. 8 ("If Utah's hazardous recreational industries are to remain viable, 
Utah's framework for analyzing and enforcing exculpatory clauses should be consistently 
followed. . . . If the language of the exculpatory clause is: (1) written clearly and is 
understandable by the average lay person, (2) if the wording of the exculpatory clause is 
displayed prominently and in an adequate type size, and (3) if the intent to relieve the 
provider of the activity from liability for alleged negligence is clearly and unequivocally 
expressed in the contractual provision, our courts should enforce that provision. The 
timorous may stay at home."). 
Public policy considerations should not invalidate an unambiguous release unless 
the activity in question affects the public interest. See Hawkins, 2001 UT 94, ^ 9 
("[M]ost courts allow release of liability for prospective negligence, except where there is 
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a strong public interest in the services provided"); Russ, 905 P.2d at 905 ("Generally, 
parties 'not engaged in public service may properly bargain against liability for harm 
caused by their ordinary negligence in performance of contractual duty; but such an 
exemption is always invalid if it applies to harm willfully inflicted or caused by gross or 
wanton negligence'"). 
Most courts in the United States follow this approach. See, e.g., Holier v. Dakota 
Speedway, Inc., 610 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 2000) (waiver did not violate public policy where 
activity did not implicate public interest, which usually requires essential or public 
service affecting public at large); Moore v. Hartley Motors, Inc., 36 P.3d 628 (Alaska 
2001) ("Of particular relevance to this case is the type of service performed and whether 
the party seeking exculpation has a decisive advantage in bargaining strength because of 
the essential nature of the service"); Plant v. Wilbur, 345 Ark. 487, 47 S.W.3d 889 (2001) 
("We are also mindful that numerous jurisdictions have found that releases containing 
similar, and sometimes identical language to this one, are not void as against public 
policy. The general rationale behind allowing these types of releases in the context of 
auto racing is that they involve a very narrow segment of the public, rather than situations 
involving a public utility, a common carrier, or a similar entity connected with the public 
interest"); Bertotti v. Charlotte Motor Speedway, Inc., 893 F.Supp. 565, 566 (W.D.N.C. 
1995) (noting that, in North Carolina and other jurisdictions, "exculpatory contracts 
entered in connection with motor sports events do not violate public policy because such 
contracts do not involve public interests"). 
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Courts applying Tunkl likewise decline to invalidate releases in recreational events 
because they are "not performing a service of great importance to the public, which is 
often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public." Westlye v. Look 
Sports, Inc., 17 Cal. App.4th 1715, 22 Cal. Rptr.2d 781, 790-91 (1993), and cases cited; 
Chauvlier v. Booth Creek Ski Holdings, Inc., 109 Wash. App. 334, 35 P.3d 383, 388 
("[A] survey of cases assessing exculpatory clauses reveals that the common 
determinative factor for Washington courts has been the services' or activities' 
importance to the public"). 
In any event, the release in this case would be upheld even under the Tunkl factors. 
The first factor is whether the contract concerns a business of a type generally thought 
suitable for public regulation. Tunkl involved services performed by a public hospital, 
obviously an appropriate area for regulation. In this case, the activity was a private 
recreational endeavor. Second, Tunkl examined whether the release involved a service of 
great importance to the public or which is often a matter of practical necessity for some 
members of the public, which again is not applicable here. 
The third Tunkl factor is whether the released party is willing to perform the 
offered service for any member of the public who seeks it or who meets certain standards. 
While the UAF, like any facility, hopes to attract customers, there is no indication in the 
record that it was required to accept all potential passengers. Indeed, had Pearce 
informed the UAF that he had a bad back, the undisputed evidence suggests that he 
would not have been permitted to ride. 
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The fourth Tunkl factor considers whether one party had a decisive advantage in 
the offering of the contract because of the essential nature of the services. As noted 
above, courts have uniformly rejected such contentions in the recreational context. The 
final Tunkl factor evaluates whether the person or property is placed under the control of 
the seller of services. The UAF did position the passengers in the sled, and did suggest 
that Pearce lean forward in the direction of travel. However, Mr. Pearce was free to 
request another position, and affected his positioning in the sled through his response 
regarding the strength of his back. 
In sum, the trial court's ruling that Paragraph 3 barred Pearce's claims for 
negligence was correct under well-settled Utah precedent, and the judgment should be 
affirmed. 
E. Pearce's claims are also barred by his assumption of risks in the opening 
clause and Paragraph 1 of the release. 
Although the Court need not reach this issue in light of Paragraph 3, Pearce's 
claims would also be barred by the opening clause of the release, in which Pearce agreed 
to assume "all risks," and by Paragraph 1, in which he assumed all inherent risks of the 
bobsled ride. 
"All risks" means all risks. Moreover, it is undisputed that one of the inherent 
risks of the bobsled - one reason it is "the ride of a lifetime" - is that swooshing down a 
mountain in a sled at 80 miles per hour generates gravitational forces of up to 5 times the 
rider's own body weight. The velocity of the bobsled and the related G-forces are exactly 
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what participants want to experience. Pearce concedes that his injury was caused solely 
by those G-forces. 
The fact that passengers in the rear of the sled experience greater G-forces than 
those in the second and third seats (a concept familiar to anyone who has ever played 
"crack the whip" in a schoolyard) does not affect the analysis. That someone in the 
second or third seat might feel only 3 or 4 Gs does not alter the fact that Pearce 
experienced no greater than the 5 Gs of which he had been warned. On this alternative 
ground as well, then, the trial court correctly dismissed Pearce's claims. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE EVIDENCE 
IN THE RECORD WAS INSUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN A CLAIM 
OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE. 
The trial court correctly held that the evidence in the record was not sufficient to 
maintain a claim for gross negligence. 
A. Pearce misconstrues the trial court's ruling. 
Before analyzing this issue, one matter should be dispensed with summarily, and 
that is Pearce's contention that the trial court applied an improper standard to the motion 
for summary judgment. In his first page of argument, Pearce claims that the trial court 
required him to produce "undisputed facts" of gross negligence in order to forestall 
summary judgment. (Brief of Appellants, p. 8.) That argument is without merit. 
It is true that one small segment of Judge Lubeck's opinion (which also 
constituted the order), if read literally, might appear to read as Pearce says. However, 
such a reading is not only unfair to the judge, but it also ignores the context and the 
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court's analysis, which clearly demonstrate that the court was assessing the gross 
negligence in light of the undisputed facts regarding UAF's actions. 
The standard for summary judgment is well known. The UAF cited it to the trial 
court in its moving papers. (R. 109.) It is clear from the entirety of Judge Lubeck's 
memorandum decision that he applied the correct standard. He did not require 
undisputed evidence of gross negligence; he required sufficient evidence of gross 
negligence. 
B. The trial court correctly held that Pearce introduced insufficient evidence to 
maintain a claim of gross negligence. 
The meaning of "gross negligence" is well defined in Utah law because, for many 
years before the enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1, it was the common law 
threshold for allowing a punitive damages claim to reach a jury. See Wilson v. Oldroyd, 
1 Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759, 765 (1954). Under this Court's precedent, gross negligence 
is essentially co-extensive with recklessness: 
While the term 'gross9 is constantly used in this connection, many cases explain it 
by declaring that the rule of exemplary damages requires negligence in such 
degree as to amount to wantonness and positive misconduct, manifesting a 
conscious disregard of the rights of others and a reckless indifference to 
consequences. 
Id. See also Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 193 (Wyo. 1979) (equating gross 
negligence to recklessness for purposes of punitive damages) (cited in Behrens v. Raleigh 
Hills Hospital Inc., 675 P.2d 1179,1187 (Utah 1983)). 
37 
While intent to injure is not required, the defendant's conduct "must be malicious 
or in reckless disregard for the rights of others, although actual intent to cause injury is 
not required. That is, the defendant must either know or should know 'that such conduct 
would, in a high degree of probability, result in substantial harm to another.'" Behrens, 
675 P.2d at 1186-87. 
Pearce adduced insufficient evidence that the UAF acted with reckless 
indifference toward him. The bobsled track was designed, engineered, and tested in 
accord with exacting local and international guidelines. The UAF adopted and 
implemented safety policies and procedures to ensure that the Public Ride Program was 
operated in accord with the standards in the industry, and that passengers were informed 
of the risks of the ride. The policies and procedures were developed in accord with 
similar facilities in Lake Placid and Calgary. 
The UAF relied upon the design and engineering experts of the sport's governing 
bodies to properly construct, design, test, inspect, and analyze the track. It networked 
with other tracks to ensure that its PRP was operated in accord with the standard in the 
industry. The bobsled run is exactly the same now as it was at the conclusion of that 
process. The slopes are the same. The radii of the curves are the same. The G-forces 
generated during the run are the same. 
The UAF hired an expert in Public Ride Programs from Canada to operate the 
facility. It hired world-class professional drivers. It required passengers to go through an 
orientation before being allowed on the ride. It prepared written materials to govern its 
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operations. It warned passengers that the ride was aggressive and might generate up to 5 
G-forces. It tried to screen out passengers with bad backs and other vulnerabilities. 
Those facts are all undisputed, and preclude a claim for gross negligence. See, e.g., 
Brooks v. Timberline Tours, Inc., 127 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 1997) (evidence was 
insufficient to demonstrate wanton negligence; therefore, exculpatory waiver barred 
plaintiffs9 claims); Flood, 398 F.3d at 1266-67 (although plaintiff claimed that defendant 
was negligent in several respects, evidence was insufficient to maintain claim of gross 
negligence). 
Pearce attempts, however, to raise the specter of gross negligence in a couple of 
ways. First, he lists a string of specific duties allegedly breached by the UAF, e.g., duty 
to ensure proper construction, duty to discover dangerous characteristics of the ride, etc. 
His experts likewise set forth various alleged breaches of duty. 
Whether these individual duties would in fact apply, and/or whether they were 
breached, is immaterial. They are all simply variations of negligence. Plaintiffs often 
hedge their bets by arguing a multitude of duties that were breached by a defendant: The 
defendant failed to keep a proper lookout. The defendant was driving too fast for the 
conditions. The defendant failed to apply his brakes in time. All of these duties might be 
breached in a single car accident, but that does not transform the defendant's conduct into 
gross negligence. It is the defendant's state of mind, not the number of duties he 
allegedly breached, that is dispositive. 
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This is not a case where the UAF acted on a whim, threw a bobsled run together 
and invited the public for a quick slide down the mountain. It was a carefully designed 
track, used in the 2002 Olympic Winter Games, and then made available to the public. 
Nonetheless, Pearce launches various criticisms at the UAF. For example, he criticizes 
the UAF for reviewing its injury reports once a year instead of as they occur. While the 
review might not have occurred as frequently as Pearce would advocate, it is undisputed 
that the UAF proactively conducted injury reviews to detect patterns or concerns, that 
PRP statistics were reviewed and analyzed by the General Manager, and that as a result 
of such reviews, the UAF has taken specific measures in an attempt to reduce track 
injuries. 
Pearce9s brief also argues that the bobsled run should have been tested with 
ordinary members of the public, and that the UAF's experience was based on highly 
conditioned Olympic athletes. This allegation, however, again states nothing more than 
negligence. There is no suggestion that the general public is subjected to greater forces 
than Olympic athletes; such an assertion would defy the laws of physics. Under Pearce's 
theory, the most that could be said is that, although it attempted to screen out passengers 
with back and neck conditions, the UAF might not have fully accounted for differences in 
the public's ability to deal with G-forces, which would constitute simple negligence at 
best. Moreover, Pearce ignores the undisputed fact that the bobsleds purchased for the 
PRP had been modified for public use, with rollover protection, handles, fins for speed 
reduction, etc. 
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Pearce also claims awareness by the UAF that, "in just the last three months three 
persons had suffered serious spinal injuries, including compression fractures." (Brief of 
Appellant, p. 3, citing R. 162 and Appx. 20-26.) On this point, he relies on three reports 
of injury by ride participants, which he also attaches to appendix on appeal.9 A review of 
those incident reports reveals only the following: (1) one participant in the fourth 
position who reported a back strain but refused medical treatment; (2) one participant, 
position unknown, who reported a compression of the spine and did not receive medical 
treatment; and (3) one participant, position unknown, who initially reported feeling a 
"jolt" and a "pop."10 
None of the incident reports indicate, let alone confirm, back fractures. Moreover, 
only one of the three incident reports indicates that the fourth position was involved. 
Considering that passengers are specifically warned that back injuries may occur from 
high G-forces, it would not be surprising that some passengers did experience discomfort. 
Pearce also claims that the UAF did not review incident reports from the prior 
operator, the Salt Lake Organizing Committee. That is a mischaracterization of the 
record. The actual testimony was that, in spite of a diligent effort, UAF personnel could 
not locate records of injury reports from the committee. (R. 162.) 
The UAF objected below to consideration of these reports as inadmissible hearsay. (R. 
161.) 
10
 A supplemental report on the third participant, dated after the plaintiffs accident, 
identified the participant's injury more specifically as a compression fracture. 
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Pearce claims that the UAF "fail[ed] to undertake any measures to prevent injuries 
in the fourth seat." That characterization, again, is not supported by the record. It is 
undisputed that UAF personnel attempted to screen out passengers with bad backs, and 
believed they were doing the right thing by instructing the fourth passenger to lean 
forward in the direction of travel and grasp the handle. Whether they were correct or not 
is not the issue; there simply is no evidence that they knew better yet consciously ignored 
the risk.11 
The undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that the UAF dedicated substantial 
resources to ensure that it was operating in accord with the industry standard. Out of 
hundreds of operational details, Pearce singles out a few elements that he claims were 
mishandled. There simply is no gross negligence claim here. 
Pearce argues, however, that testimony of his experts creates an issue of fact. 
There are two problems with this contention. First, although otherwise admissible 
testimony is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the 
trier of fact, U.R.E. 704(a), "[nevertheless, opinions that 'tell the jury what result to 
reach' or 'give legal conclusions' continue to be impermissible under rule 704." State v. 
Davis, 2007 UT App 13, f 15, 155 P3d 909, and cases cited; Steffenson v. Smith's 
Management Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1348 (Utah 1993); Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 
11
 Pearce's brief says "[t]his injury was entirely preventable." (Brief of Appellant, p. 4.) 
No record citation is provided, and the statement is not supported by the record. Pearce's 
expert testified only that the risk of spinal injury could have been "reduced" if the fourth 
rider assumed a more upright posture, pushing off the handles and not flexing the spine. 
(id.) 
42 
1225 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991) (testimony that party was 
"negligent" was impermissible legal opinion). 
Whether the evidence supports submission of the case to a jury on the question of 
gross negligence is a legal determination for the Court, i.e., the Court must determine 
whether the facts as admitted by defendant for purposes of is motion below would 
warrant the giving of a jury instruction as to gross negligence. An expert may opine as to 
whether a defendant breached the standard of care in a particular instance, but the experts 
in this case were not familiar with - nor did they address - the standard of care in the 
bobsled industry. (R. 161.) Neither expert offered any analyses of the UAF's 
compliance or failure to comply with the applicable standard of care, either regarding 
warnings, the bobsleds, or operation of the track. The trial court correctly held that no 
genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to gross negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, appellee Utah Athletic Foundation respectfully 
requests the Court to affirm the trial court's judgment. 
DATED this V ^ d a y of May, 2007. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Karra J. Porter W 
Ruth A. Shapiro 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A RULING and ORDER, September 14, 2006 
Exhibit B AGREEMENT TO USE FACILITIES OF OLYMPIC PARKS OF UTAH 
Exhibit A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES PEARCE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH ATHLETIC FOUNDATION dba 
UTAH WINTER SPORTS PARK, and 
OSCAR PODAR, 
Defendants. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 040500322 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: September 14, 2006 
The above matter came before the court on September 11, 
2006, for oral argument on Utah Athletic Foundation's (UAF or 
defendant) motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff was present 
through Fred R. Silvester and Spencer C. Siebers and defendant 
was present through Ruth A. Shapiro. Defendant filed this motion 
on May 2, 2006. Plaintiff filed an opposition response on Ma^ 
31, 2006. Defendant filed a reply on June 8, 2006. A request to 
submit was filed by defendant on June 8, 2006. Oral argument was 
scheduled and held September 11, 2006. The court took the matter 
under advisement. 
The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties, heard 
oral argument, and concludes as follows. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff filed a complaint May 10, 2004, alleging he was 
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injured on a bobsled attraction operated by defendant in 
February, 2003. He alleged two causes of negligent action by 
defendant. An amended complaint was filed, by stipulation, on 
February 25, 2005. It added a defendant Podar and alleged two 
claims of negligence (negligence, gross negligence) against the 
UAF and added a claim of breach of warranty and claimed Podar was 
strictly liable and was negligent in selling the bobsleds to UAF. 
ARGUMENTS 
Defendant UAF moves for summary judgment alleging the 
negligence claims are barred by a contract executed by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's breach of warranty claim is barred because there was 
no warranty by defendant. 
Defendant claims as undisputed facts that plaintiff suffered 
a lumbar fracture while riding a public bobsled in February 2003. 
Defendant is an organization that oversees the Utah Olympic Park 
and other venues. The ride, used in the 2002 Winter Olympics, 
was open to the public in 1997, in what is called a Public Ride 
Program (PRP) . After the 2002 Olympics UAF assumed ownership and 
operation of the bobsled track. Many contractors and engineers 
participated in the construction of the bobsled run for the State 
of Utah. An international federation ensures a track is built 
and meets design criteria. This process, called "homologization" 
includes many scientific specifications. The operation of the 
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truck involves a general manager, a director of operations, a 
track supervisor, a control tower operator, track technician and 
crew, PRP starters, passenger supervisor, bobsled technicians and 
a safety/compliance coordinator. Maintenance goes on during each 
day of operation. The track is inspected daily by certified 
personnel who walk the track, and it is re-inspected and re-
certified if there is a 20 minute gap in sled activity. As to the 
PRP, the sleds used are four-man sleds, with a driver and three 
passengers. The driver in the PRP also does the braking. World-
class drivers are utilized in the PRP as drivers. UAF developed 
procedures for the PRP, and those include instructions to 
personnel and a "Frequently Asked Questions'' sheet for 
participants. In arriving at procedures as to how to best advise 
the participants, the only other tracks in North America (there 
are two others, in Calgary and Lake Placid) were consulted. A one 
hour orientation, including a video and oral presentation, is 
required before participants may ride. The presentations explain 
the nature of the ride and the risks involved. Each rider is 
required to sign a Release. The fourth position in the bobsled 
is the most intense and riders are so advised and warned. 
Plaintiff is a mechanical engineer and active in outdoor sports 
activities. Plaintiff signed the Release and saw the 
instructional video and heard the oral presentation. Plaintiff 
knew what G-force entailed. Plaintiff told track personnel he had 
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no back problems but in fact had suffered a ruptured disk in 
1997. 
Defendant claims the Release excludes claims based on 
negligence. Contracts that clearly and unequivocally preclude 
claims for negligence are enforceable. This Release states this 
activity may put the rider at risk of serious Injury or illness. 
The Release states that UAF is discharged from liability whether 
caused by negligence of UAF or otherwise. 
As to gross negligence, the court may conclude as a matter 
of law the case does not rise to the leveL of gross negligence. 
Gross negligence is often involved in a cLaim for punitive 
damages, and that requires willfulness or conduct that manifests 
a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, 
the rights of others. Here, the track was designed according to 
international guidelines, it was certified by the governing 
international body, it is operated with proper safety policies 
that comport with the two other bobsled tracks in North America, 
the PRP program addresses the risks and gives appropriate 
information and guidance. This is an inherently risky activity 
and an accident occurred due to fast speeds of a heavy sled on 
ice. Any failures by UAF are mere negligence, not gross 
negligence, and UAF denies any failures and denies negligence. 
As to the breach of warranty claim it must fail because no 
warranty, express or implied, was made by UAF. A service was 
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ptovided and there is and was no warranty. The Release also 
disclaimed any warranties. There was no contract except the 
Release in this case. No result was guaranteed. Any implied 
warranty is fulfilled by the exercise of customary or reasonable 
11 involved. 
In opposition plaintiff argues the fourth position is 
dangerous and defendant knew it as two injuries had recently 
occurred to riders seated in that position. No special testing 
was conducted nor were special warnings given about that 
position. 
Plaintiff contests some of the facts dealing with the 
adjectives and superlatives of defendant's claimed facts. There 
was no "extensive" testing, no one hour orientation, and 
plaintiff did not "understand" the ride. Plaintiff disputes that 
he was given any special instructions or warning concerning the 
fourth position. Plaintiff claims he did not intend to release 
defendant from liability. 
As additional facts, plaintiff claims he signed the document 
but did not know what it was, and he was not told and did not 
understand it was a release of liability. The orientation was 15 
minutes. Expert testimony will show that by leaning forward as 
he was instructed, the fourth rider increases his exposure to 
compression fractures. UAF did not undertake any study 
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concerning the fourth position rider. The ratio of injury for the 
fourth iseat passenger is 1 to 66, showing the gross nature of the 
neglif»«. 
Plaintiff argues the Release does not bar the negligence 
claim because he was injured not by the inherent risk of the ride 
but because of the nature of the fourth position, which risk 
plaintiff was not aware of and did not assume. Falling out, 
tipping over, and hitting something are inherent in the high 
speed ride, but not suffering a compression fracture because of 
G-force in the fourth position, coupled with the erroneous advice 
about how to position oneself. To assume the risk, one must know 
of the risk, and voluntarily consent tc assume it. An inherent 
risk is one that cannot be alleviated by the use of reasonable 
care. Here, the negligence of the provider of service is not 
inherent. If a risk can be eliminated by the use of ordinary 
care, it is not an inherent risk. 
Other parts of the Release, part II], only release defendant 
from liability arising from assumed risks, those named in Part I. 
Releases are not favored, and it must be explicit and unequivocal 
and unambiguous. 
This Release only releases UAF from assumed risk. This is 
said to be ambiguous and the narrower interpretation reflects the 
intent of the parties. The assumed risks are named in Part I of 
the release, such as collision, falling out or tipping over. 
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Inherent risks are assumed, but that does not include negligence. 
In part III negligence claims are waived, and so the only 
consistent interpretation is that negligence involving assumed 
risks are waived. The fourth seat risk could be eliminated or 
alleviated, and thus it is not an inherent risk. 
The Release does not meet the test of explicitness and is 
not clearly understood. It is confusing and subject to 
misinterpretation. 
Further, it is unconscionable as defendant argues its 
meaning. It would allow defendant to escape all liability for 
anything, something which is against public policy. Where UAF 
knew, or should have known, of a risk, and did not advise others 
but attempts to waive liability for such, public policy is 
violated. There was here no meeting of the minds, thus no 
contract. Plaintiff was not told of the risks of this position. 
As to gross negligence, there are questions of fact dealing 
with whether the ride was properly designed and constructed, 
whether UAF knew of the unreasonable risks, whether there were 
any dangerous conditions, and what warnings needed to be given. 
What dynamics of the ride were known, what physical testing and 
what patron feedback occurred are factual questions that are not 
without dispute, and those all contribute to gross negligence. 
The breach of warranty claim exists as defendant warrants it 
has used reasonable care. Defendant held itself out as offering 
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a safe ride for the public, and plaintiff has evidence reasonable 
care was not used. 
In reply defendant argues that plaintiff's characterizations 
of meaning are not disputes of fact. Other disputes are 
discussed. 
Defendant argues the issue is whether the release is legally 
enforceable. Defendant claims the Release is clear in that it 
releases defendant from its negligence, among other things. Other 
similar releases have been upheld, they meet the test of enforce 
ability. The question presented by plaintiff that he did not 
understand the Release is irrelevant. The question is one of 
enforce ability. Plaintiff clearly knew he could be hurt and he 
released defendant. All plaintiff argues is that he knew he 
could be hurt, but he did not know he couLd be hurt in the way he 
was in fact hurt. 
Plaintiff assumed the inherent risk of the activity. 
Inherent risks also include those risks a participant wishes to 
confront. Here, the speed and G-force ace those features of the 
ride that plaintiff desired to participate in or experience. The 
danger involved here does not deal with the manner in which the 
injury could occur, but merely that an injury (or death) could 
occur. 
There has been no credible evidence of gross negligence 
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presented by plaintiffs Hfe opinions of the m^m^s of plaintiff 
are legal conclusions, and are not entitled to weight as they 
cannot opine on the question of negligence. The court is to make 
a legal determination of whether there has been gross negligence. 
There certainly is no evidence of malice or wilfulness and 
plaintiff claims none. At most mere negligence is shown. 
The warranty claim must fail, as the cases relied on by 
plaintiff are duties from statute. 
DISCUSSION 
It seems to the court that plaintiff has presented no 
evidence that would allow a jury to determine there was any gross 
negligence. Defendant defines gross negligence as "the failure 
to observe even slight care; it is carelessness or recklessness 
to a degree that shows utter indifference to the consequences 
that may result." Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States 
Telephone, 109 P.2D 330 (Utah 1985). Plaintiff defines it from 
the Restatement, section 500, arguing it is a lesser standard. 
That section provides: 
NN
 . . . conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of 
another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an 
act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or 
having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable 
man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an 
unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that 
such risk is substantially greater than that which is 
necessary to make his conduct negligent." 
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Whatever definition is used BpMtaRMCt, the court does not 
believe plaintiff has set forth sufficient evidence of gross 
negligence. There must be undisputed facts in evidence relating 
to each element of the claim before a party may prevail. 
Examining the burden of proof plaintiff would bear, the court 
cannot state there are undisputed facts that would show he is 
entitled to relief under a theory of gross negLigence. Here, 
whatever definition of gross negligence LS used, the court cannot 
conclude as a matter of law that gross negligence could be 
proven. The court is not weighing evidence, and it is giving 
all inferences due to plaintiff. Whatever disputes exist as to 
just what UAF knew before February 2003, It appears at best for 
plaintiff that there were two injuries to other riders, and it 
was not revealed those other participants were in the fourth 
position, nor that a fractured back was tie result. Thusr 
plaintiff's claim that UAF did improper research as to the 
effects of the fourth posit Lon, did not ivarn others, and failed 
to use other means to insure a safe ride appear without merit to 
the court in terms of establishing gross negligence. 
At most, such failures by defendant to investigate and warn 
would be negligence. Of course the general rule is that because 
negligence cases often require the drawing of inferences from the 
facts, which is properly done by juries lather than judges, 
"summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only in the 
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clearest instances." Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P. 2d 182, 
183 (Utah 1991)." Here, the doctrine of gross negligence would 
seem to require the same standard. From the evidence before the 
court there is simply no way in which the court can conclude 
otherwise than that there has been no gross negligence shown and 
such could not be shown. 
Experts were hired to design the track, and it meets all 
specifications for such a track from all entities dealing with 
such facilities. The expert opinions of plaintiff do not opine 
on the standard of care in such an industry. There is certainly 
no wilfulness shown or alleged. There is no credible evidence of 
gross negligence as a matter of law. 
Here there are some disputes about some facts, but the court 
determines those disputes are not over material facts. The court 
cannot envision that it matters whether the "briefing" or 
instructional period given to plaintiff was an hour as defendant 
asserts or 15 minutes as plaintiff asserts. There are other such 
disputes but they do not foreclose summary judgment. 
Similarly, whether plaintiff "understood" the Release is 
not material, He signed the Release and the document indicates 
it should not be signed unless understood. The Release is 
specific in its instructions to the participants that the 
participants should not sign the Release unless it has been read 
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and undersWHf 
The court does not read the Release as plaintiff urges. 
Plaintiff in essence contends that the listed dangers in Part I 
are the only dangers, inherent risks, thab he waived in Part III. 
The court disagrees. 
The Release does not indicate any and all hazards that may 
be encountered. Plaintiff's argument is not availing because the 
Release is clear and states that the ride involves many inherent 
risks and dangers, and participation puts the participant at risk 
of serious injury or illness or death. Some dangers are Listed, 
stating they include but are not limited to, collision, weather 
and variations in terrain, accidents b^ other participants, 
failure to follow safety procedures or stay in control, and 
limits or defects in the facilities. The Release states bhe 
participant is aware the UAF cannot and does not guarantee 
safety. The Release then states the participant freely accepts 
and fully assumes the risk of property damage, illness, severe 
personal injury or even death by using the facilities, "not only 
in the ways described above, but also jn ways that are unknown 
and unexpected, even if I . . . follow the instruct 
advice.,, Plaintiff's arguments may have some merit if the list of 
"inherent risks'' stated it was an exclusive list and, for 
example, these 8 things are the only 8 things that may go wrong. 
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The Release, however, states that the participant understands 
many, unnamed things may go wrong resulting in injury and the 
participant waives recovery concerning any risk. 
To the court, plaintiff's arguments that the risk of the 
fourth position were not explained and reasonable care was not 
taken to protect against injuries is covered by the last phrase 
of Part I of the Release. The Release explains there are dangers, 
some named and some not, and that participants may be hurt in 
certain ways mentioned, or in unknown ways. While it does not 
specifically state that the fourth position may be the most 
dangerous, even if that was known to UAF, reasonable caution and 
care and the duty involved do not require that EVERY POSSIBLE 
means of injury be explained in detail. The warnings were 
explicit and broad. There are countless and innumerable ways one 
could imagine being hurt on such a ride, from falling out to ice 
chunks falling off the run and hitting the participants in the 
head to driver error to falling structures and on and on. Not 
all of those hazards in such a ride could be explained and 
listed. The assumption clause covered all risks, not merely 
those named. It is not reasonable to expect any provider to list 
all possible means of possible injury. Risks were explained 
fully, in bold type. 
Whether UAF was aware of the fourth position risks or not, 
whether UAF had done sufficient research, and so on, are not 
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determinative as it did not amount to gioss negligence. Claims 
for negligence were then waited in Part I]I. No evidence has 
been presented that shows there was anything other than full 
disclosure that dangers were involved, some known and named and 
some unknown. 
The Release in Part III then states again that UAF is not an 
insurer of conduct, and to the fullest extent permitted by law, 
the participant waives any claims of liability of any action 
whatsoever arising out of the activity related to any damage, 
loss, or injury, including death, that may be sustained arising 
out of the use of the facility, whether caused by the negligence 
of UAF or otherwise. 
Again, not every possible hazard is explained in detail but 
in a broad way, and the Release is intent LonalLy broad and covers 
negligence, and the participant agrees not to maintain any action 
even if UAF is negligent and that negligence results in injury. 
Here, injury occurred and even if there was negligence in UAF's 
alleged failure to properly study the fourth position and in 
failing to properly warn against the fourth position hazard, that 
negligence was waived. 
The court does not see that such a Release is against public 
policy. This activity is obviously, from a common sense 
standpoint, dangerous. It is fast and is usually done by 
""professionals," that is, Olympic athletes. The warnings clearly 
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state speeds of over 80 miles per hour may be achieved. Whether 
such a ride should be made available to the public is not for the 
court to determine. The question is, may a provider of such a 
ride protect itself against such claims as plaintiff brings by 
having participants sign a Release that the participant may be 
hurt but will not assert claims against UAF. The court believes 
the Release is enforceable and valid. 
The risks were assumed. The ride is obviously and clearly 
dangerous and injury may occur. Injury did occur. The court 
agrees with UAF that plaintiff understood that, he just did not 
know the manner and means by which he may be injured. 
At to the breach of warranty claim, the court also agrees 
with UAF. There is no implied warranty involved and no statute or 
regulation creates one and the Release does not create one 
expressly, or by implication. There is a contract, which 
specifically states defendant is NOT an insurer of the safety of 
the participants. That is sufficient to demonstrate UAF does not 
warrant a safe ride. Again, risks are explained, including 
death, and to a fair minded person that may or may not create a 
situation meriting a second thought about participating in the 
ride. The only warranty that could be involved in such a 
situation is that the customary and reasonable skill in the area 
of the activity will be exercised. Whether that customary skill 
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I?l^f#xercised is not determinativer as the discussion above as to 
waiver of negligence claims covers this warranty if it existed as 
to any negligent conduct. 
The motion of UAF for summary judgment is GRANTED. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. 
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Exhibit B 
AGREbn/IENT TO USE FACILITIES OF OLYMPIC PAR..o OF UTAH 
OLYMPIC PARKS 
^ J P P F - IMPORTANT THIS IS A LEGAL DOCUMENT, PLEASE READ IN FULL AND UNDERSTAND BEFORE SIGNING 
You/your minor child (if applicable) may be hurt using the facilities and equipment of the Olympic Parks of Utah, which include the Utah 
Olympic Park, the Utah Olympic Oval and Soldier Hollow (the "Sports Facilities"). If you are unwilling to assume all the risks of your/your 
minor child's use of the Sports Facilities, DO NOT sign this document, in which case you/your minor child will NOT be authorized to use the 
Sports Facilities, and you will be refunded any monies you paid to use the Sports Facilities. If you sign this document BUT make any 
alterations to it, you are NOT authorized to use the Sports Facilities. 
1 Assumptions of Risks. I, for myself or as the parent/legal guardian of the participating minor child whose name is listed below ("Participant"), 
wish to use the Sports Facilities and may engage in one or more sports, including without limitation alpine, nordic and freestyle ski jumping, 
snowboardmg (including freestyle jumping), rocket sled, bobsled, skeleton, luge, open slope luge (and any wheeled versions of such equipment), cross 
country skiing (and any wheeled versions of such equipment), biathalon, speed skating, hockey, curling, and related use of training equipment 
including without limitation trampoline, spotting rig equipment, pool, roller jump, bungee rig and push track, air rifles, hockey sticks, pucks, curling 
stones (collectively, the aSportsM) I understand that the Sports are high-speed action and adventure sports that involve many inherent risks and 
dangers, and that using the Sports Facilities or participating in the Sports may put me/my minor child at risk of serious iniury or illness These dangers 
include but are not limited to use of ski lifts and tows, collision with structures and devices, risk-creating weather conditions and variations in terrain, 
accidents by other users of the Sports Facilities, failure to follow safety procedures, or to stay within ability or control, limits or defects in the Sports 
Facilities I am also aware that hazards may exist throughout the Sports Facilities, may be unmarked and occur without warning, and that helmets, 
safety equipment, proficiency checks, supervision and enforcement of rules do not and cannot guarantee my/my minor child's safety I am/my minor 
child is able to perform the essential functions required to use the Sports Facilities and participate in the Sports and I am/my minor child is freely and 
voluntarily participating in the Sports and the use of the Sports Facilities I REPRESENT AND WARRANT THAT I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD 
THIS DOCUMENT, AM OF SOUND MIND, HAVE LEGAL AUTHORITY, AND FREELY ACCEPT AND FULLY ASSUME THE RISK THAT l/MY 
MINOR CHILD CAN SUFFER PROPERTY DAMAGE, ILLNESS, SEVERE PERSONAL INJURY OR EVEN DEATH BY USING THE SPORTS 
FACILITIES OR PARTICIPATING IN THE SPORTS, not only the ways described above, but also in ways that are unknown and unexpected, even if I 
follow/my minor child follows instructions or advice 
2 Consent to Medical Treatment, Consent to Use of Images, Etc. If I am unable to consent at the time, due to injury, illness or absence, I hereby 
consent to administration of first aid and other emergency medical treatment for such injury or illness that occurs during my/my minor child's use of the 
Sports Facilities or participation in the Sports I have/my minor child has adequate health insurance or resources to cover the costs of treatment in 
case of any such injury or illness I agree to refrain/cause my minor child to refrain from and not to be impaired by the use of alcohol or any controlled 
substance (except as medically authorized) while using the Sports Facilities or participating in the Sports I grant to the Olympic Parks of Utah ("UAF") 
and its assigns the right to use, reproduce, display, distribute and make derivative works, in any and all media, of my/my minor child's voice and 
likeness recorded while using the Sports Facilities or participating in the Sports and any biographical information furnished by me/my minor child to the 
UAF 
3 Waiver, Release and Indemnification I understand and agree that the UAF is not an insurer of my/my minor child s conduct TO THE FULLEST 
EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, I HEREBY RELEASE, WAIVE, COVENANT NOT TO SUE, AND DISCHARGE THE UAF AND ALL OF ITS 
TRUSTEES DIRECTORS, MANAGERS, OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, VOLUNTEERS, AGENTS AND REPRESENTATIVES (COLLECTIVELY, THE 
"RELEASEES") FROM ANY AND ALL LIABILITY, CLAIMS, DEMANDS AND CAUSES OF ACTION WHATSOEVER ARISING OUT OF OR 
RELATED TO ANY LOSS, DAMAGE, OR INJURY, INCLUDING DEATH, THAT MAY BE SUSTAINED BY ME/MY MINOR CHILD OR LOSS OR 
DAMAGE TO ANY PROPERTY BELONGING TO ME/MY MINOR CHILD, WHETHER CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF RELEASEES OR 
OTHERWISE ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO MY/MY MINOR CHILD S USE OF THE SPORTS FACILITIES OR PARTICIPATION IN THE 
SPORTS I ALSO AGREE THAT, IN THE EVENT THAT ANY PERSON BRINGS ANY CLAIM OR ACTION INDIVIDUALLY OR ON BEHALF OF MY 
MINOR CHILD, RELATED TO ANY INJURY OR LOSS SUFFERED BY MY MINOR CHILD AS A RESULT OF MY MINOR CHILD'S USE OF THE 
SPORTS FACILITIES OR PARTICIPATION IN THE SPORTS, THAT I WILL INDEMNIFY THE RELEASEES AGAINST SUCH CLAIMS INCLUDING 
PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES I AGREE THAT THIS DOCUMENT SHALL BIND MY GUARDIAN, ASSIGNS, HEIRS, ADMINISTRATORS AND 
EXECUTORS FOREVER 
In the event any one or more of the provisions contained in this Agreement shall for any reason be held to be invalid, illegal or 
unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, illegality or unenforceability shall not affect the validity of any other provision hereof and this 
Agreement shall be construed as if such invalid, illegal or unenforceable provision were not contained herein 
Name.. 
FULL NAME OF PARTICIPANT 
Date of Birth: 
Signature:, 
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT 
. Today's Date:. 
Parent/Guardian MUST sign below 
IF Participant is younger than 18 
Circle how related to Participant Parent /Guardian 
PRINT NAME OF PARENT/GUARDIAN 
.Date 
SIGNATURE OF PARENT/GUARDIAN 
Street 
Address* _City:_ .State: 
_Zip: 
MAILING ADDRESS OF PARTICIPANT (or Parent/Guardian if Participant is younger than 18) 
EMERGENCY CONTACT NAME: 
Exhibit A 
to 
_Country:_ 
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